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Abstract
Legal enforcement of bans on goods can reduce the size of the black market but lead to
greater violence by increasing revenue in the illicit market. However, the link between
enforcement and violence is not as simple as is suggested by the textbook model, even for a
competitive market. Nevertheless, under plausible assumptions more enforcement on
trafficking in the illicit good leads to more violence.
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1. Introduction
The textbook model of markets for illicit drugs (as in Frank and Bernanke (2004), for
example) predicts that stronger enforcement raises prices, revenue, and violence. The clear
prediction depends on inelastic demand, the assumed competitiveness of the market, and
enforcement that targets suppliers only. Models of noncompetitive black markets or markets in
disequilibrium, on the other hand, find that the link between enforcement and violence can take
other forms (Caulkins et al., 2003; Caulkins and Reuter, 2010; Rasmussen et al., 1993). This note
shows that even in a competitive market in equilibrium, enforcement against trafficking in the
illicit good can lead to less violence as long as it also includes buyers. Nevertheless, under
plausible assumptions for illicit drug markets, enforcement will lead to more violence.

2. The Model
Consider a competitive market for a banned good. While in principle the market may be
for any illicit good, demand for the good is assumed to be inelastic as in the markets for
addictive substances. Effort expended in enforcement against trafficking in the good is proxied
with a continuous variable,

. The other assumptions and notation follow.
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receive
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derives as usual from marginal production and distribution costs. We
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. Enforcement of the ban raises the effective marginal cost of doing
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( ). Following Reuter and Kleiman (1986), these additional costs

include the monetization of the non-monetary perceived risks of arrest, sanction, fine, and
incarceration, as well as any supply-disruptive activity following from enforcement, such as
1

( )

product seizure. We assume that
(

)(

) with a ban. Price

⁄

and

. Marginal production costs are

will refer to the monetary price exchanging hands in the
(

market, excluding any risk adjustments. Defining

) , the quantity supplied under

enforcement is thus:1
(
imply that ( )

The properties of

( ( ) ).

)

, ( )

(1)
⁄

and

.

Demand

The illicit quantity demanded under a ban,
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, is a downward-sloping, differentiable
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pay,
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elasticity
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. If enforcement targets

buyers, then the perceived inclusive expenditure on the product rises by multiple ( ). This “risk
tax” on buyers acts like a psychic expenditure tax of rate
( )

and

⁄

. We assume the risk tax satisfies

. In this simple model there is only a single variable for enforcement,

and any differential impact of enforcement on the two sides of the market caused by different
allocations of enforcement effort is captured implicitly by the elasticities of the functions

and

. The quantity demanded at black market price , accounting for buyer risk from enforcement,
is:
(

)

( ( ) ).
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Violence

Since the insights of Goldstein (1985), it is common in models of illicit markets to
assume that violence V rises with illicit revenue R earned in the market:

( )

. V includes

both demand-side crime committed to raise money for purchasing the good and crime
1

The derivation follows from the fact that the supply function is the inverse of the marginal cost curve of the
( )(
) yields
( [
industry. Inversion of
( )]) and thus equation (1).
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perpetrated among suppliers (for example, to establish sales turf). We set aside any direct
⁄

beneficial effect of enforcement effort on violence (

), since (following the textbook

model) we model enforcement against trafficking and not violence per se.

3. The Impact of Enforcement on Violence
Consider how prices, revenue, and violence change as enforcement ramps up. Define
excess demand as (

)

(

the equilibrium condition (

)

)

(

). Then applying the implicit function theorem to

gives an expression for how the equilibrium price changes

with enforcement:2
⁄
⁄

⁄

⁄

(3)

where the elasticities are understood to be evaluated at the effective prices

and

. The

denominator of (3) is unambiguously positive, and so the sign of the expression depends only on
the numerator. Thus market price will increase with marginal increases in enforcement if and
only if
(4)
where

is the elasticity of function

with respect to enforcement. Both sides of inequality (4)

are positive. The left side captures the demand-side price sensitivity to changes in enforcement,
while the right side reflects the supply side. Whether the condition is satisfied depends on the
relative magnitudes involved. This conclusion is in contrast to the simple textbook reasoning that
more enforcement leads to higher prices by shifting the supply curve up. The price effect of
increased enforcement is ambiguous in general because if demand is elastic enough or
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The derivation uses the facts that
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consumers are highly sensitive to enforcement risk, the demand-side effects can cause the market
price to fall. We analyze various cases below to draw additional insight from the model.
If the demand curve did not shift, and demand is inelastic as assumed, then knowing the
direction of the price change also lets us know how revenue and violence change. However,
when the demand curve shifts downward in response to enforcement, there is a countervailing
̂

effect on revenue. Equilibrium revenue can be written as

( ̂ ), where

̂ is the

equilibrium price given enforcement level . The total impact on violence of a marginal change
in enforcement level is
̂

[

̂

(
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̂

)
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(5)

̂

̂
⏟

[
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by assumption. The first term in the brackets is the price effect. When

enforcement rises, the price changes in accord with equation (3), which has a marginal impact on
revenue. The term in parentheses in the price effect is the usual marginal revenue term for an
increase in price. For the assumed inelastic demand, this term is always positive:
̂

(

)

.

Thus, when the demand curve sits still, revenue change has the same sign as

̂⁄

. This

is usually assumed in the textbook analysis of illicit markets and violence.3 However, the second
term in equation (5), the direct impact of enforcement on the demand curve (the “demandshifting” effect, or DSE), is negative. From equation (2), we have:

3

See, e.g., Caulkins et al. (2006): “A standard argument in the analysis of drug markets is that when enforcement
drives up the price of the drug, it also increases the revenues flowing to drug dealers if demand is inelastic.”
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̂
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.

(6)

This term is the offsetting effect on revenue of the demand curve shifting down in response to
enforcement risk. Thus, even when the sign on the price change is clear from inequality (5), the
total effect on revenue and violence is unclear. If the DSE is large enough in magnitude, there is
less revenue in response to a price increase even with inelastic demand. However, the DSE is
smaller in magnitude when demand is more inelastic and when the effective price paid by
consumers is less sensitive to enforcement. In the conclusion we discuss why these assumptions
are likely to apply to illicit drug markets. Therefore we expect that the DSE will attenuate but not
reverse the primary impact on revenue of the price change. We refer to this as “assumption DSE”
below in the various types of markets now considered.
Case 1: No direct enforcement on consumers

If enforcement is focused entirely on suppliers and consumers are left alone, then

,

condition (4) is satisfied, and the price rises with enforcement effort. With no countervailing
DSE in equation (5), there will be greater violence with stronger enforcement. This is the
textbook analysis.
Case 2: The long run in a constant-cost industry

In the long run in a competitive constant-cost industry the supply curve is horizontal.
With infinite

, inequality (4) is satisfied and greater enforcement of a ban leads to higher

prices. Under assumption DSE there will be more revenue and therefore more violence.
Case 3: Completely inelastic demand

5

If there is no responsiveness to price at all on the demand side, perhaps because all but
the hardest-core addicts have left the market,4 then since

, inequality (4) is satisfied and

the price rises with more enforcement. Furthermore, from equation (6) there is no DSE, so
violence also rises.
Case 4: The general case

Rearranging terms, condition (4) for the price change can be expressed as:
.

(7)

The price will rise with more enforcement in any market in which demand is less elastic than
supply and more enforcement is targeted toward the supply side (as measured by the impacts on
risk-adjusted prices given by the elasticity ratios on the right side). Under assumption DSE,
violence also rises in such markets. Note that small

and

make conditions (6) and (7) both

easier to satisfy.

4. Conclusions
When a good is banned, enforcement aimed at supporting the ban indirectly affects
violence occasioned by the market. Enforcement shifts the supply and demand curves, which
change price, revenue, and violence. In contrast to the textbook model with supply-side
enforcement only, when buyers are targeted as well, two additional nuances arise in the
relationship between enforcement and revenue. First, the price increase is attenuated—or even
reversed—by the increased risk borne by consumers. Second, the downward shift in demand
decreases revenue. Thus, the link between enforcement and violence depends on more than the

4

The argument assumes that users wish to consume a fixed number of hits per day. On the other hand, a referee
pointed out that if hard-core addicts spend virtually all their disposable income on drugs, then their demand would
be very price-elastic.
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elasticity of demand. However, under plausible circumstances pertaining to markets for many
illicit goods—supply more elastic than demand and enforcement targeted more toward
suppliers—an increase in enforcement has the unintended consequence of more violence.
It is interesting to consider applying the model to menthol cigarettes, which the United
States Food and Drug Administration is considering banning.5 Numerous studies have shown
that demand for cigarettes (in general, or for menthol cigarettes in particular) is highly inelastic
(Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Tauras et al., 2010). If enforcement of a ban follows the pattern
set by other illicit drug markets, enforcement will fall primarily on suppliers. Under these
conditions, the model shows that enforcement raises prices, the demand-shifting effect on
revenue is small, revenue rises, and there is more violence. The result does not imply that the
level of violence would be as large as that associated with other illicit drugs; clearly the violence
function may differ by good, geography, and other factors. Nevertheless, minimizing total harm
from menthol cigarettes means minimizing the sum of social harms from consumption of the
banned good and the additional harms inadvertently caused by enforcement. Policymaking
should therefore consider the indirect costs of enforcement when calculating the costs and
benefits of a ban.
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